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Summary findings
In its latest World Health Report, the World Health  With the WHO's  index, progressiveness and
Organization  (WHO) argues that a key dimension of a  regressiveness are both treated as unfair. This makes no
health system's performance is the fairness of its  sense, because policymakers who may be strongly averse
financing system. The report  discusses how policymakers  to regressive payments (which worsen income
can improve this aspect of performance, proposes an  distribution) may in the name of fairness be quite
index of fairness, discusses how it should be put into  receptive to progressive payments (requiring that the
operation,  and presents a league table of countries  better-off, who may be willing to spend proportionately
ranked by the fairness with which their health services  more on health care, are required to pay proportionately
are financed.  more).
Wagstaff shows that the WHO index cannot  Wagstaff compares the WHO index with an alternative
discriminate between health financing systems that are  and more illuminating approach developed in the income
regressive and those that are progressive-and  cannot  redistribution literature in the early 1990s and used in
discriminate between horizontal inequity and  the late 1990s to study the fairness of various OECD
progressiveness or regressiveness.  health care financing systems.
The index cannot tell policymakers whether  it deviates  He illustrates the differences between the approaches
from 1 (complete fairness) because households with  with an empirical comparison, using data on out-of-
similar incomes spend different amounts on health care  pocket payments for health services in Vietnam for 1993
(horizontal inequity) or because households with  and 1998. This analysis is of some interest in its own
different incomes spend different proportions  of their  right, given the large share of health spending from out-
income on health care (vertical inequity, given the  of-pocket payments in Vietnam and the changes in fees
WHO's interpretation  of the ability-to-pay principle)-  and drug prices over the 1990s.
although the two have different policy implications.
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I.  Introduction
In its latest World Health Report (WHR) Health Systems: Improving Performance, the
World  Health  Organization  [1] breaks  new  ground  not  only  by  focusing  attention  on  the
performnance  of health systems, but also by arguing that a key dimension of a health system's
performance  is  the  fairness  of  its  financing  system.  In  addition  to  discussing  the  ways
policymakers can improve fairness in health financing, the report proposes an index of fairness,
discusses how it should be operationalized, and goes on to present a league table of the world's
191 countries ranked by the fairness with which their health services are financed.  Apparently,
the  report has been  the  subject of  a  good  deal of  comment-favorable  and  unfavorable,  it
seems-but  for the most part this appears to have been amongst journalists  and policymakers.
Critical assessments by researchers of the report's methods and results have been limited to date.
Such assessments are, however, clearly important, given the potential impact the report and its
league tables may have on policymakers and the international development community.
The aim of this paper is to provide an assessment of the report's quantitative work on the
fairness of health care financing.  Regrettably, the focus of the paper has been confined to the
properties of WHO's  fairness index, since no details are available about the empirical work on
financing presented in the report.'  The only thing that can be said with any certainty is that
although values of the WHO fairness index are presented for 191 countries, in only 19 of these
was the index computed from  household survey data.  Indeed, in all but  one of the countries
ranked in the top 40 (Colombia) the FFC index was "estimated".  Whilst it is not unheard of to
interpolate "missing" data in this way, it is surprising that no documentation is available setting
out the  methods used.  Perhaps even more  surprising is that  WHO should  attach so much
importance to the values of the index for the 172 countries where index values were estimated. 2
The concerns that several health ministers have expressed about the WHR rankings are, in such
circumstances, understandable.
The paper begins in  section II with a discussion of the ethical premise underlying the
WHO index-that  households ought  to be expected to  pay for health care in  line with their
ability to pay. The paper suggests that the ability-to-pay principle is best understood in terms of a
desire on the part of policymakers to limit the impact of health care payments on the distribution
of  disposable  income.  Whilst  there  appears to  be  a  good deal  of  support  for  the  general
principle, the proportionality version of it adopted by the WHO is harder to defend.  The paper
goes on in section III to draw out the properties of the WHO index and in section IV argues that
they  are  highly  unattractive.  The index  is  unable  to  distinguish  between  progressive  and
regressive payments,  and  is  also  unable to  distinguish between  cases  where  households on
l  Discussion  papers  have been  promised  but have yet to appear  on the WHO  website. One might  even  have hoped
that they would  have been written  and distributed  in time to provide  the basis for a discussion  of the methods  prior
to the work  being undertaken.
2  In the 1991 World Bank's World  Development  Report, for example,  poverty indices were estimated for 22
countries out of  86, but the 22 countries covered 76% of the population of the  86 countries, and only regional
aggregates were published (the country-specific values were never made public precisely because they were felt to
be too imprecise) (cf. Ravallion et al. 1991).2
different incomes pay different shares of their income in health care payments and cases where
households at the same income pay different amounts for health care.  The index is also sensitive
to the overall average share of income spent on health care.  Section V outlines an alternative
approach developed  in the income redistribution literature and used in the health  economics
literature in the late 1  990s.  This approach explicitly approaches the fairness of health financing
in  terms  of  its  impact on the  distribution  of income,  and  allows  one to  show the  separate
redistributive effects of the average proportion of income spent on health care, the progressivity
or regressiveness of the payment structure, the horizontal inequities in the financing system, and
the extent of reranking generated by it (well-off households becoming poor, and vice versa).  The
paper ends in section VI with an empirical illustration of this method using data on out-of-pocket
payments from Vietnam for two years-1993  and  1998.  Though this is intended simply as an
illustration of the two approaches, the analysis is of some interest from a policy perspective.  A
recent assessment of the Vietnamese health sector [2] highlighted Vietnam's  heavy reliance on
out-of-pocket  payments  to  finance  health  care-81%  of  health  spending  in  Vietnam  was
financed privately in 1997, and this was almost entirely paid out-of-pocket.  The assessment also
highlighted, however, two important changes over the course of the 1990s: rising user fees (even
at supposedly free commune health centers), offset-at  least in part-by  reductions in the cost of
medicines.
II.  Health  Care Payments  and Ability  to Pay
WHO calls its index an index of fairness of financial contribution (FFC).  The index aims
to capture empirically the financial protection issue highlighted in chapter 5 of the WHR.  This is
evidently only one aspect of fa&rness  in health financing, since the way a country finances its
health  care-and  in  particular the balance it strikes between pre-payments  and out-of-pocket
payments-has  implications not just  for how people pay for health care (the focus of the FFC
index) but also for whc uses health services, how often and how much.  The FFC index does not
capture-and  does not purport to capture-how  fair a financing system is in terms of its impact
on the distribution of access to and utilization of health services.  The limited objective of the
FFC index-and  the alternative suggested below-needs  to be borne in mind.
LINKING  PAYMENTS TOABILITY TO PAY-WHY?
The WHR argues that a key dimension of performance in a health care system is how
fairly  it  protects  households  financially.  Underlying  the  FFC  index  is  one  particular
interpretation of the term "fairness in financial protection", namely that households ought to be
required to pay for  health care in line with their ability-to-pay (ATP).  There appears, in fact, to
be widespread support amongst policymakers and the public at large for the principle of linking
health care payments to ability to pay [3].  There has, however, been relatively little discussion
of the rationale underlying this.  As Culyer [4] notes, one obvious, reason that might be advanced
in support of the principle is that policymakers are concerned that payments for health care affect
people's  ability to  seek health  care when ill.  This concern stems from  a more fundamental
concern of policymakers with the distribution of health service utilization and ultimately with the
distribution of health itself.  But this simply provides a rationale for de-linking payments and
utilization-it  does not provide a rationale for linking payments to ATP [5].  A flat-rate tax, for3
example, would de-link payments from service utilization but would not link payments to ability
to pay.
There is, however, as Culyer notes, another reason why policymakers may be concerned
to link payments for health services to ATP rather than to service usage, namely that payments
for health services reduce households'  ability to buy other goods and services (e.g. food), and
policymakers are concerned about the distribution of these as well as about the distribution of
health services.  Policymakers, in other words, are not so much concerned about the distribution
of health care payments per  se.  Rather they are concerned to ensure that this the distribution
does not have an unduly adverse effect on the distribution of disposable income.  It  is in this
sense that policymakers appear to wish to link payments for health care to households' ATP.
This begs the question, of course, of why policymakers appear to take the view that it is
not fair for a household's disposable income to be compromised by payments for health care but
that it is fair for a household's  disposable income to be compromised by spending on, say, a
skiing vacation, or a gas-guzzling sports utility vehicle.  The reason for this  is probably that
policymakers see health care payments as an involuntary item of expenditure, brought about by
an unwanted health shock and required in order to restore health status to its previous level, or as
close to it as is possible, and take the view that the community as a whole should jointly bear the
financial burden of such shocks in order that the distributions of health status and disposable
income are not worsened. 3
LINKING  PAYMENTS TOABILITY  TO PAY-HOW?
Requiring that health care payments be linked to ability to pay can be interpreted in terms
of vertical equity (in this case the requirement that households of unequal ability to pay make
appropriately dissimilar payments) and horizontal equity (the requirement that households of the
same ability to pay make the same contribution) [3].  In the case of vertical equity, consideration
has to be given to the precise form that the differential treatment should take.  Should better-off
households  be  paying  more than worse-off households in  absolute  terms or  in  proportional
terms?  In the latter case, vertical equity would require that payments be progressive.  In the
former  case,  payments  could  be  proportional  to  ability-to-pay,  or  even  regressive  (poorer
households paying a  larger share of their income than better-off households).  Though many
policymakers appear to  support the  application of the ability-to-pay  principle to  health  care
finance,  rarely-if  ever-do  policies  and policymakers  specify  the "appropriate"  degree  of
progressivity.
In constructing its FFC index, the WHO starts from the premise that health care payments
ought to be proportional  to ATP.  In other words, everyone-irrespective  of their ATP-ought
to pay the same proportion of their ATP on health care.  We discuss below the appropriateness of
this premise.  Suffice to say for the moment that its adoption allows WHO to construct an index
that simply focuses on disproportionality.
3  There are other possibilities with respect to the impact on incomes.  One is that policymakers wish to reduce the
impact on poverty rather than income inequality-cf.  Wagstaff, Watanabe and van Doorslaer (2000).4
III. WHO's  FFC Index and its Properties
Let us suppose for the moment that we have some measure of ability to pay.  (Below we
will have something to say about WHO's approach to measuring ATP.  We can safely put these
concerns aside for the moment-if  the index makes sense, it should not hinge on one particular
operationalization  of  the  concept  of  ability to  pay.)  The WHO  index  computes,  for  each
household, health care spending expressed as a proportion of the household's ability to pay.  The
report calls this ratio HFC-health  financing contribution. The WHO index of fairness of this
contribution captures the variation of HFC around its mean.  Specifically, the index for a given
country is the third absolute moment around the mean of HFC:
(1)  FFC =  1-4  Eh,HFCHFC|I
0.125H
where FFC is fairness of financial contribution, h indexes households, and H is the number of
households in the sarnple.  The index is similar to the variance, but gives a greater weight to
values  far from the mean.  It  is expressed in such a way that it takes a value  of one  when
everyone pays the same proportion of their ATP in health care payments, and has a value of less
than one when there is inequality in health care payments as a proportion of ATP.
The FFC index has three noteworthy properties.  The rest of this section sets these out.
The next section discusses their desirability.
First, the FFC index reflects both vertical and horizontal inequity.  If the index's  value is
less than one, this could be for one or both of two reasons.  It could be that households with
similar ATPs are spending different proportions of their ATP on health care (a violation of the
principle of horizontal equity) or that households with different ATPs are spending different
proportions of their ATP on health care (a violation of the principle of vertical equity).  A value
of FFC  that is different from one could be because the system is horizontally inequitable,  or
vertically inequitable, or both.
The second property worth noting is that the index treats progressivity and regressiveness
symmetrically.  The  index is  based on the premise  that any  violation of the vertical  equity
principle is bad.  A value of FFC below one could arise because the better-off who pay a larger
proportion of their ATP than the poor (the case of progressive payments), or because the poor
pay a larger proportion of their ATP than the better-off (the case of regressive payments). The
index does not allow us to know which.
The third noteworthy property is that, in general, the index will also reflect the average
proportion  of  ATP  absorbed  by  health  care payments.  Except  in  the  extreme case  where
everyone pays the same proportion of their ATP towards health care, the index is sensitive to the
average proportion of ATP spent on health care. The index thus reflects not just  vertical and
horizontal inequity, but also the proportion of ATP absorbed by health care.  The index shares
this property with the variance, which is sensitive to the mean of the variable whose variation is
being measured.5
These three properties are illustrated in Fig 1. The inverted u-shaped curves illustrate the
fact that  moving towards  proportionality-by  either reducing regresssiveness or by reducing
progressivity-moves  the index towards its upper limit of one.  The effect of reducing horizontal
inequity is to push these curves upwards.  In the limit, as horizontal inequities are eliminated
altogether, the curve touches one at its upper point (i.e. where proportionality is achieved).







IV. Are the Properties of WHO's FFC Index Attractive?
OUGHT PROGRESSIVITY  TO  BE TREA  TED  SYMMETRICALL  Y TO REGRESSIVENESS?
It  is  convenient  to  take  the  second  property  first-the  fact  that  the  index  treats
progressivity  and  regressiveness  symmetrically.  This  property  follows  logically  from  the
proportionality version of the ability-to-pay principle, but it takes only a moment's reflection to
realize just how unattractive it is.  Progressive and regressive payments have opposite effects on
the distribution of income-progressive  payments reduce income  inequality, while regressive
payments  increase it  [6, 7].  In other words, under  progressive payments, there will be  less
inequality in postpayment income (i.e. the income households have available after paying for
health care) than in prepayment income (i.e. the income they have available before paying for
health care).  Under regressive payments, there will be more inequality in postpayment income
than in prepayment income.
It  is hard  to  see  why policymakers  should view  increases  and  decreases  in  income
inequality brought about by health care payments as just  as bad as one another. There is good
evidence that regressive payments are perceived by policymakers and the public at large as being
unfair.  It  is  not  at all  clear that policymakers and  the general  public  feel that progressive
payments are automatically unfair.6
For one thing, the better-off may choose to spend a higher proportion  of their income
than the poor.  Indeed, the WHR acknowledges this and concedes that this would probably not-
at least for health financing purposes-be  viewed as inequitable. 4 Despite this, the fact remains
that the FFC  index treats progressive payments as automatically unfair.  Thus two countries
could have the same value of the WHO index, but in one country the shortfall from one could be
due to the poor paying a larger proportion of their income in health care payments (presumably
"involuntarily"), whilst in the other country, the shortfall from one could be due to the better-off
spending (to a degree, presumably, voluntarily) a larger share of their income on health care than
the poor.
There is another reason to think that policymakers and the public do not treat progressive
and regressive payments symmetrically, namely that they may want to see health care payments
exerting  an  equalizing  impact  on  the  income  distribution.  If  health  care  payments  are
proportional to prepayment income, all this means is that health care payments absorb the same
share of a rich household's prepayment income as a poor household's.  Both households, in other
words,  have  the  same  percentage  drop  in  their  incomes,  moving  from  the  prepayment  to
postpayment distributions.  Policymakers may quite reasonably take the view that even this may
compromise  too  much  poor  households'  ability to  purchase food  and  other key  goods  and
services.  They might feel that a fairer scheme would be one in which the poor are not expected
to contribute anything to the financing of health care but the nonpoor are expected to shoulder
the burden of financing health care at least in proportion to their income.
All this suggests that an index that is blind between progressive and regressive health
care payments is not especially useful.  Having said, this it seems wise not to prejudge the issue
too  much.  What  seems  best  is  to  employ  an  index that  allows  policymakers to  see  how
progressive or regressive their health  care financing system is.  The approach outlined below
allows one to do preciselv this.
SHOULD  VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL INEQUITY BE TREA  TED SIMILARLY?
As defined, the FFC index can take a value of less than one either because households
with similar ATPs are spending different proportions of their ATP on health  care (horizontal
inequity) or because households with different ATPs are spending different proportions of their
ATP on health care (vertical inequity, given the proportionality requirement).  There are various
reasons why one would like to be able to discriminate empirically between these two types of
disproportionality.
First,  whilst  horizontal  inequity  necessarily  increases  income  inequality  [8], vertical
inequity  (defined ai la  WHO)  can-as  has  been seen above-either  reduce it  or increase  it,
depending  on whether payments are progressive or regressive.  Suppose Transylvania has  a
health care financing system that displays a lot of horizontal inequity but is progressive.  The
disequalizing effect of the horizontal differences might well be offset by the equalizing effect of
the  progressive  payment  structure,  so that  distribution  of  postpayment  income  is  no  more
unequal than the distribution of prepayment income.  The policymaker's  fairness objective of
4 Confusingly, the report suggests that it is not inequitable, providing it is prepaid and not paid out-of-pocket.7
ensuring that the health care financing system does not worsen the distribution of income is thus
satisfied.  And yet the FFC  index classifies the Transylvanian system as unfair.  Indeed, the
index would  classify the  system  as  more unfair  than a  proportional  financing  system  that
contains as  much horizontal  inequity  as the Transylvanian system,  and  more unfair  than  a
horizontally equitable system with the same degree of progressivity as the Translyvanian system.
If  the  concern  ultimately  is  to  know how  a  health  care  financing  system  impacts  on  the
distribution of disposable income, then disproportionality arising from horizontal inequity needs
to  be  capable  of  being  distinguished  empirically  from  disproportionality  arising  from
progressivity or regressiveness.
Second,  even  both  types  of  disproportionality  reinforce  one  another  (i.e.  horizontal
inequity is reinforced by or reinforces regressiveness), it is important to be able to distinguish
empirically between the cases.  One reason is that horizontal equity and regressiveness typically
imply different policy responses.  Consider, for example, the case of social insurance.  Reducing
horizontal inequity might involve reducing disparities in sickness fund contribution schedules, by
for  example  applying  the  same  contribution  schedule to  civil  servants  as  applies  to  state
enterprise workers, or by mandating that competing sickness funds use a national contribution
schedule.  By contrast, reducing regressiveness might involve turning a regressive schedule with
a contribution ceiling into a proportional schedule without a contribution ceiling.
Another reason for wanting to distinguish between regressiveness and horizontal inequity
is that some may argue that not all horizontal differences are inequitable.  In the context of health
care financing, horizontal differences might rise for a  variety of  different reasons.  In direct
taxation, which often  contributes a  sizeable share to  public financing,  equals can be treated
unequally  due  to,  for  example, tax  deductibility  of mortgage  interest payments  and  health
insurance  premiums.  In  indirect  tax  payments,  horizontal differences  might  arise  through
different spending levels at a given prepayment income level, but also through different spending
patterns (some commodities attract higher indirect tax rates than others).  In social insurance,
different schemes sometimes have different contribution schedules, whilst in private insurance
premiums paid at a given income level may vary due to different risks, as well as different levels
of and type of coverage (including, of course non-coverage).  In the context of out-of-pocket
payments, horizontal differences might arise because of different utilization levels at a given
prepayment income level (in part, of course, due to differences in illness), or because of different
prices paid per unit of service. The latter may reflect differences in quality, or-especially  in the
charitable and public sectors-the  existence of fee exemptions that are not income-related (e.g.
linked to the existence of chronic conditions, pregnancy, or membership of certain groups such
as the armed services).
The issue arises as to whether all of these reasons for horizontal differences are likely to
be regarded as equally unfair by policymakers, or even unfair at all.  One might argue that whilst
tax relief on mortgage interest payments is inequitable, it is not inequitable if, in the context of
indirect  taxation,  some  households  spend more  of  their  income  than  others,  or  that  some
households at a given income level spend a lot on goods and services attracting high tax rates
whilst others at the same income spend much less on these high-tax goods and services.  One
might argue that it was inequitable that, in China in the early 1990s, the cost of social health
insurance coverage  for civil  servants was covered out  of general  taxation, whilst  the social
insurance scheme for  state enterprise employees (which  actually had less generous coverage)8
was funded largely through contributions from the enterprises (with presumably some backwards
shifting onto wages).  And one might argue that it is also inequitable if households struck by
illness  spend  more  out-of-pocket  than  households not  struck  by  illness,  but  that  it  is  not
inequitable if an ill person on a given income wants to spend more on health care than a similarly
ill person on the same income.
On other hand,  it might be argued that  it is the totality  of health care payments that
matters.  Health care is financed from a mixture of taxes, social insurance, private insurance and
out-of-pocket payments, and the concern is with the impact of all these payments combined on
the  distribution  of  postpayment  income.  If  horizontal  differences  increase  the  degree  of
inequality in postpayment income, then all such differences are of equal concern.  According to
this view, it does matter that a health care system relying almost entirely on indirect taxes to
finance it shows up as having a larger degree of horizontal inequity, other things equal, than a
system relying almost entirely on direct taxes.  If we want to avoid an unduly large impact of
health care payments on the income distribution, then all horizontal differences in health care
payments are to be avoided wherever they arise in the health care financing system.
These two viewpoints obviously point towards different approaches, at least insofar as
data make this  possible.  The case-by-case approach points towards separating  out horizontal
differences that arise from unequal treatment of equals, and focusing only on these.  The second
approach points  towards  focusing on all  horizontal differences and  treating  all on  an  equal
footing. The WHR takes the second approach.  This is not an unreasonable position to adopt, but
it is not uncontroversial.
SHOULD THE  A VERA  GE PA  YMENTRA  TE  BE SUBSUMED  WITH  THE OTHER  INFLUENCES?
As it stands, the index is sensitive to the average payment rate. Except in the extreme
case where everyone pays the same proportion of their ATP towards health care, the index will
reflect not just  the extent of horizontal and vertical equity, but also the average proportion of
income (or ATP) spent on health care.  So, one cannot be sure how far countries have different
values of FFC because they have different degrees of inequality in the proportion of income
spent on health care or because the average proportion of income  spent differs. As with  the
previous two properties, this seems unattractive.  It would seem much better to have an index
that allowed one to separate out these two issues.
V.  An Alternative Approach
There are, then, at least three unattractive features of WHO's  FFC index:  it does not
distinguish between progressivity and regressiveness; it does not distinguish between horizontal
and vertical differences in the proportion of ATP spent on health  care; nor does  it allow the
analyst  to  discern how  far  countries  differ in  their  indices because  of different  degrees  of
inequality in  payment rates or different average proportions of  income spent  on health  care.
What is called for is an  approach that separates clearly these different issues and embeds the
measurement of fairness  in financial contribution firmly in the overall policy concern, which
appears to be a concern to avoid health care payments having an undue adverse effect  on the9
distribution of income.  Fortunately, an approach is available that does just this.  Developed in
the public finance and income redistribution literature in the early 1990s [8], the approach was
used to measure equity in health care finance in several OECD countries in the latter part of the
1990s [6, 7].  This section outlines the approach, and the next section applies it data on out-of-
pocket payments from Vietnam.
DECOMPOSING  REDISTRIBUTIVE  EFFECT
The redistributive effect of a tax-i.e.  the impact of a tax on the distribution of income-
depends on four key factors [8].  The same reasoning can be applied to health care payments.  In
the case where income inequality is measured using the Gini coefficient, redistributive effect,
RE,  is simply the difference between the Gini coefficient for prepayment income Gpre,  and the
Gini coefficient for postpayment income, Gp,,,.  This has been shown by Aronson et al. to be
equal to:
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An explanation of these various indices and their interpretation follows.
VERTICAL  INCOME  REDISTRIB  UTION-THE ROLE  OF PROGRESSIVITY
The term V in eqn (2) represents vertical  income redistribution-the  change in income
inequality that would have been brought  about by health  care payments  if everyone at  each
prepayment income level had paid the same amount towards health  care.  V depends  on two
things, one of which is K.  This is Kakwani's  [9] index of progressivity, but computed on the
assumption  that  at  each  income  level  everyone  spends  the  same  amount  on  health  care.
Kakwani's  index, illustrated in  Fig 3, is  defined as twice  the area between  the prepayment
Lorenz curve, Lpre,  and the payment concentration curve, Lpay,  the latter being the graph of the
cumulative share of health care payments against the cumulative share of the population, ranked
by prepayment income.  Equivalently, K is the difference between the payment concentration
index  (defined  analogously  to  the  Gini  coefficient  but  with  reference  to  the  payment
concentration curve) and the Gini coefficient.  A positive value of K indicates a progressive
payment  structure (the case illustrated in Fig 2), whilst a negative value indicates a regressive
structure.10
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Payments that are progressive on prepayment income will exert an equalizing effect  on
the income  distribution-the  Lorenz curve for postpayment income, Lp,,,  will lie above  the
Lorenz  curve  for  preprayment  income,  Lp,.  By  contrast,  payments  that  are  regressive  on
prepayment  income  will exert  a disequalizing  effect  on the  income  distribution,  so that Lpost  will
lie  below  Lp,e  So,  a policymaker  who  is concerned  to ensure  that  health  care  payments  do  not
adversely  affect  the  distribution  of postpayment  income  will  clearly  disfavor  regressive  health
care payments.
It is thus the  progressivity  of payments  on prepayment  income  that  will determine,  other
things  equal,  the  degree  of inequality  in  postpayment  income-i.e.  the  degree  of inequality  in
households'  ability  to purchase  things  other  than  health  care, such  as food.  This  draws  attention
to another  defect  of the WHO  work,  namely  its definition  of ATP  in terms  of income  after food
'pending.  Clearly,  in  the  light  of  the  above,  one  needs  to  measure  both  prepayment  and
postpayment  income  before  food outlays.  Knowing  how progressive  health  care payments  are on
prepayment  income  defined  net offood  outlays  tells  us how  health  care payments  influence  the
distribution  of income  available  to  spend  on things  other than  health  care  including  food.  But
that misses  the policymaker's  concern  entirely,  which  is precisely  that poor households  may  have
too little  left after health  care  costs  to purchase  food.  Looking  at households'  income  after  food
expenses  have  been  netted  out conceals  from  us completely  their ability to afford  food.11
VERTICAL INCOME REDISTRIBUTION-THE  ROLE OF THE INCOME SHARE ABSORBED BY
PA YMENTS
The second component of V is g.  This is the share of pre-payment income absorbed by
health  care  payments.  Other  things  equal,  and  except  in  the  case  where  payments  are
proportional  to prepayment income,  the larger the share of prepayment income absorbed  by
health payments, the greater the impact of health care payments on the distribution of income.
Thus, for example, in their study of redistributive effect of the health care financing systems of
the OECD countries, van Doorslaer et al. [7] highlight the fact that although the share of health
care payments financed out of general taxation in the United States is low by comparison with
other OECD countries, because the US spends such a large proportion of its GDP on health care,
the share of income spent on health care through the tax system (i.e. g) is relatively large.  This,
coupled with the fact that the progressivity of general taxation in the US appears to be fairly high
by international standards, produces the somewhat surprising result that the taxes used to finance
health care produce more vertical income redistribution in the US than in other OECD countries.
The WHO index reflects the average proportion of prepayment income spent on health
care.  This is to be welcomed inasmuch as g is an important influence on redistributive effect not
captured  by  progressivity.  It  is,  however,  clearly a  separate issue  from  progressivity,  and
policies  can be  drawn up that  alter g  but not  K, and vice versa.  Thus the fact that, unlike
Aronson et al.'s  decomposition, the WHO index does not allow the analyst to know how far
cross-country  differences  in  FFC reflects  differences in g  or differences  in  departures from
proportionality seems an unattractive feature of the index.
HORIZONTAL INEQUITY
In eqn  (2),  H is  classical horizontal inequity.  In  the Aronson  et al.  decomposition,
households  are  divided  into  groups of  prepayment  equals,  and  then  horizontal  inequity  is
assessed in terms of the extent of inequality in postpayment income within each group. In eqn
(2), at, is the product of the population share and postpayment income share of households with
prepayment  income  x,  while  GF(X)  is  Gini  coefficient  for  postpayment  income  for  these
households.  If at each prepayment income level, all households pay the same towards health
care, inequality  in  postpayment  income will  be  zero for each  group of prepayment  income
equals.  Any  inequality  within  any  group  counts  as  horizontal  inequity.  Inequality  in
postpayment income within each group is measured by the Gini coefficient GF(X),  and a weighted
sum of these Gini coefficients is constructed, where the weights are the a%'s.  This weighted sum
is H.  Note  that, because the Gini coefficients for each group of prepayment equals is  non-
negative, H is also non-negative. Note too that H appears in eqn (2) with a minus sign in front of
it.  In other words, horizontal inequity necessarily reduces RE.  This is simply a reflection of the
fact that since horizontal inequity entails inequality in postpayment incomes within at least some
groups of prepayment equals, it will always leave the postpayment income  distribution more
unequal than would have been the case in the absence of  horizontal inequity.12
AND WHAT  OF RERANKING?
The  V term  in  eqn  (2)  tells  us how  income  inequality  is reduced  by  virtue  of  the
progressivity or regressiveness  of health  care payments, on the assumption everyone at  each
prepayment  income level pays  the same towards health care.  The H term tells us that with
horizontal differences at each income level, the postpayment income distribution will be  less
equal than V would suggest.  In the case of regressive payments, H reinforces the disequalizing
effect of V,  while in the case of progressive payments it offsets it.
The terms V and H together take us from the prepayment Lorenz curve to a new curve,
where  households  are still ranked by their  prepayment income,  but  where the  value  on the
vertical axis tells us their postpayment income.  This is the postpayment concentration  curve,
labeled CCp,, in Fig 3, and the index corresponding to it is Cx.p in eqn (2).  This curve will only
coincide  with  the  Lorenz  curve  for  postpayment  income-in  which,  in  contrast  to  the
postpayment concentration curve, households are ranked by postpayment income-if  households
do not move up or down the income distribution as a result of health care payments.  If there is
some reranking in the move from the prepayment to postpayment distribution, the postpayment
concentration curve will lie above the postpayment Lorenz curve.  The reason is simple [10].
Suppose there  is reranking  at all percentiles of the  income distribution.  Then some  of the
households who amongst the poorest 20% of households in the prepayment income distribution
may well not be amongst the poorest 20% of households in the postpayment income distribution.
If this is the case, the share of total postpayment income accruing to the households who were
the poorest 20% in the prepayment distribution will be larger than the share of total postpayment
income accruing to the households in the poorest fifth in the postpayment distribution.  Thus the
concentration  curve  for  postpayment  income  can  never  lie  below  the  Lorenz  curve  for
postpayment income, and insofar as there is reranking will lie above the Lorenz curve.  Thus
Cx p will never be larger than Gp,,t, and R will always be nonnegative.13
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Reranking is quite likely.  In principle, reranking could be for one or both of two reasons.
The first, is that the marginal "tax" rate may exceed I100%.  This is unlikely to be a very common
problem.  The more common reason for reranking is horizontal inequality.  This is shown in Fig
4 in the case where payments are progressive on prepayment income, X, and hence postpayment
income, X-P, increases in prepayment income but at a decreasing rate.  The average postpayment
income at any level of prepayment income can be read off the function in Fig 4.  There will,
however, be variations around this mean.  These variations are reflected in a "fan" emanating
from the point on the postpayment income function corresponding to the prepayment income
level in question, branching out to the postpayment income axis.  For example, a household with
a  prepayment  income of  $1100 might  pay  $250 in  health care  payments, ending  up  in the
postpayment  distribution behind the average household with a prepayment income of $1000,
which spends only $  1000.14
Fig 4:
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In short, differences in health care payments at each income level be sufficiently large for
households  starting off  close to  one  another in  the prepayment  distribution  to  change  their
positions in the move to the postpayment distribution.  This possibility was illustrated vividly in
the World Bank's  Voices of the Poor exercise [11], which reported that in Lao Cai, Vietnam, a
26 year-old man had moved from being the richest man in his community to one of the poorest
as a result of the large health care costs necessitated by his daughter's severe illness.
Such rerankings are captured in the move from the postpayment concentration curve to
the postpayment Lorenz curve.  They are captured numerically by R in eqn (3).  The overlapping
of fans (causing households to move up or down the income distribution as a result of health care
payments) is conceptually distinct from horizontal inequity (the existence of fans).  However, if
horizontal differences are the usual source of non-zero values of R,  it seems unwise to try to
make too much of the distinction between R and H.  This is reinforced by the fact that although
in  the  population  at  large  there  will be  households  on  the  same prepayment  income,  in  a
household survey such instances are rare.  In empirical work, it therefore becomes necessary to
define equals by reference to bands of prepayment income, within which, for the purpose of the
exercise, households are deemed to be equal.  The choice of bandwidth inevitably affects the
computed value of H, but also affects the computed value of R.  Specifically, it seems to be the
case that as the bandwidth is widened, H falls and R rises.  However, the sum of H and R does
not seem to change much.  This coupled with the fact that it is typically horizontal differences
that produce reranking, suggests that it may make sense to focus on the sum of H and R, and to
treat the sum as capturing horizontal differences.
PUTTING  ITALL TOGETHER
This  section  suggested that  the most  sensible way  to  approach equity  in  health  care
financing  is to treat  it explicitly  as an income  redistribution problem-policymakers  are  not15
concerned with the distribution of health care payments per se, but rather with their effect on the
distribution  of  income.  The  decomposition proposed by  Aronson  et  al.  provides  a  useful
framework  for assessing  the merits  of  WHO's  index.  The decomposition emphasizes  that
progressive  and regressive payments have different  effects on  income inequality, the former
reducing income inequality, the latter increasing it.  The WHO index's  inability to distinguish
between progressive and regressive payments thus renders it incapable of distinguishing between
a health care financing system that reduces income inequality and one that increases it.  If it is
true that the concern of policymakers lies with the impact of health care payments on income
inequality, this is a serious limitation of the index. The decomposition also emphasizes that if we
wish to examine the influence of health care payments on household's  ability to purchase food
and other key goods and services, we need to assess the progressivity of health payments on
prepayment income  before food  spending.  Assessing the impact of health care payments on
income after food has already been netted out, as the WHR does, makes little sense.  In addition,
the  decomposition  provides  a  framework  for  empirically  disentangling  (a)  the  vertical
redistribution associated with progressivity (K) from vertical redistribution associated with health
care  absorbing  a  larger  share  of  income  (g),  and  (b)  redistribution  attributable to  vertical
differences (V) from redistribution attributable to horizontal differences (H).  Since the policy
issues in each  case are different, this  seems to  be a  major advantage of the Aronson  et al.
decomposition and a major limitation of the WHO index.
VI. An Empirical  Illustration:
Out-of-Pocket  Payments  in Vietnam,  1993-98
In this final section, we compare empirically the usefulness of WHO's FFC index and the
alternative Aronson et al. approach, using data  on out-of-pocket payments in  Vietnam  as an
illustration.  As indicated in the Introduction, this is not an uninteresting case study, since around
80% of health spending in Vietnam is paid out-of-pocket [2].  Furthermore, three key changes
occurred during  the  1990s [2].  First, user  fees in the public sector rose.  The increase was
especially pronounced for hospital care, where fees appear to have risen by over 1000% in real
terms between 1993 and 1998, but were also noticeable in commune health centers even though
these were still supposed to be free in 1998.  Second, there was a large rise in fees for private
clinics and doctors.  These apparently rose by nearly 600% over the period 1993-98.  Third,
expenditures on drugs actuallyfell over the period 1993-98, due to a 30% fall in the real price of
medicines  during  the  period  in  question.  The  latter  seems  to  have  been  due  in  part  to
deregulation of the  pharmaceutical sector and  in  part to  increased  donor assistance  in  drug
supplies.
DATA,  VARIABLE DEFINITIONSAND  COMPUTATIONS
The  data  are  taken  from  the  1992-93 and  1997-98 Living  Standards  Measurement
Surveys (LSMS) undertaken jointly by the government of Vietnam and the World Bank.  For the
purpose of this exercise, the household is taken as the unit of analysis.  After deletion of cases
with missing  information, the sample contained 4800 households in  1993 and  5999 in  1998.
Household prepayment income is measured by total household consumption, gross of out-of-
pocket  payments for health  services.  Household postpayment  income is  simply prepayment16
income  so  defined  net  of  out-of-pocket  payments.  For  reasons  indicated  in  section  V,
prepayment and postpayment income are both defined to be gross of food consumption-this
enables us to see in the case of postpayment income what households have available to spend on
food after paying for health services.  Both prepayment and postpayment income are defined on
a per  capita basis.  Out-of-pocket payments are derived in both  years from two questions  on
health spending over the last 12 months, one specifically on hospital care, the other on all other
goods and services associated with the treatment and diagnosis of illness and injury.
The WHO FFC index is computed on the same data to provide the comparison with the
Aronson et al. approach.  The FFC index is straightforward to compute.  The Aronson et al.
decomposition is more involved.  RE can be computed simply as the difference between Gpre  and
Gp,st. In each case, the convenient covariance approach was used on household-level data [121.
The out-of-pocket share g is computed simply as mean out-of-pocket payments divided by mean
prepayment income.  To compute K (or more precisely the concentration index for out-of-pocket
payments, Cp) and Cx p one has to decide on appropriate groups of prepayment equals. 5 In this
illustration, prepayment equals were defined by expressing prepayment income as a multiple of
the  poverty  lines derived  by  Glewwe,  Gragnolati and  Zaman  [131.  Households  below  the
poverty line were divided into eight groups, the first comprising households with a prepayment
income between 0% and 12.5% of the poverty line, the second comprising households with  a
prepayment income between 12.5% and 25% of the poverty line, and so on.  Households with a
prepayment income of between 100% and 200% of the poverty line were divided into just  four
groups, along similar lines, while those  with prepayment incomes  in excess of  200% of the
poverty line were divided into just  three groups.  To put this into perspective, nearly 60% of
households fell below the poverty line in 1993, and nearly 40% did in 1998.  Obviously, other
groupings of prepayment equals are possible.  If this were intended as anything other than an
illustration, one  would want  to  assess the  sensitivity of the results  to  alternative groupings,
though it seems likely that in this case as in other cases where the Aronson et al. decomposition
has been used, widening the bandwidth would be likely to reduce H, increase R, but probably
leave  their  sum  relatively  unaffected.  With  groups  of  prepayment  equals  defined,  it  is
straightforward to compute Cp on the grouped data, and to form the ranking variable to compute
Cxp.  Using the former and Gpre,  one can compute K, and using the latter and Gpost  one can
compute R. This leaves H, which can be computed as a residual.
RESULTS
Using the definitions  indicated above, the values of the WHO FFC  index for  out-of-
pocket payments in Vietnam in 1993 and 1998 are 0.9557 and 0.9617 respectively (cf. Table 1).
These are different from the number published in the WHR, in part because the FFC index here
is computed only for out-of-pocket payments (the WHR claims to allocate health revenues from
all  sources)  and  in  part  because  food  consumption  has  not  been  netted  out  from  total
consumption in this  exercise for the reasons indicated above.  The change in the FFC  index
suggests  a  move  towards  greater  fairness  in  the  out-of-pocket  payment  component  of  the
5  Recall that the Kakwani index in eqn (2) needs to be computed on the assumption that everyone at each level of
prepayment income pays the same amount in health care.  Hence the need for groups of prepayment equals even in
the computation of K.17
Vietnamese health care financing system.  However, the figures give us no clue as to the reasons
for this change.  Moreover, given that the index is blind as to who pays more as a share of their
income, the increase in  FFC is consistent with a change from quite progressive out-of-pocket
payments to slightly regressive out-of-pocket payments (cf  Fig 1).
Table 1 also shows the values of the components of the Aronson et al. decomposition of
redistributive effect.  The Gini coefficient for prepayment income increased somewhat (a 7%
rise) between  1993 and  1998.  In both years, out-of-pocket payments exerted a disequalizing
effect on the income distribution, but in neither year was the impact especially large.  To put
these figures  in perspective,  van  Doorslaer et  al.  [7], using  somewhat different  definitions,
obtained  values of RE  for out-of-pocket payments  for Portugal and  the US  of  -0.0111  and
-0.0128 respectively.  However, although the magnitude of RE is not especially high in Table 1,
what is noteworthy is that that it fell dramatically (by nearly 50%) between 1993 and 1998.  This
was  attributable  to  both  changes  in  vertical  redistribution  (V)  and  changes  in  horizontal
differences and reranking (H and R).
Table 1:
FFC and RE decomposition for out-of-pocket  payments in Vietnam, 1993 and 1998
1993  1998  % change
FFC  0.9557  0.9617  1%
Gp,,  0.3444  0.3700  7%
RE  -0.0053  -0.0028  -48%
,  6.0%  5.5%  -8%
K  -0.0325  -0.0139  -57%
V  -0.0021  -0.0008  -61%
H  0.0014  0.0007  -52%
R  0.0019  0.0013  -31%
H+R  0.0033  0.0020  -40%
V %  38.5%  29.2%
H %  -25.8%  -23.7%
R%  -35.6%  -47.1%
H+R %  -61.5%  -70.8%
The reduction in pro-rich redistribution was due in part to a reduction in the overall share
of prepayment income absorbed by out-of-pocket payments-from  6.0% of prepayment income
to 5.5%, a reduction of 8%. This is presumably a reflection of higher user fees at public facilities
being more than offset by smaller outlays on medicines, the latter being due to the 30% reduction
in their real price.  But by far the bigger change was the reduction in the regressiveness of out-of-
pocket  payments.  Over the  period  in  question,  the Kakwani  index  changed  (became  less
regressive)  by  nearly  60%.  This  presumably  reflects  the  large  share  of  out-of-pocket
expenditures absorbed by drugs (especially for the poor) and the fall in the real price of drugs.
The offsetting effect of increased fees in public facilities may well have had little impact on the
financing burden.  By  1998 the fees in the public sector had become  so high  relative to  the18
average  poor household's  income that it  seems likely that the rise in  fees will  simply have
deterred the poor from using services. This does not get reflected, of course, in the assessment of
financial fairness.  Overall,  V changed by 61% between  1993 and  1998-a  larger percentage
change than in the case of RE.
The other determinants of redistributive effect were also important during the period in
question, and also changed.  In both years, there was more pro-rich income redistribution caused
by horizontal inequity and reranking than there was caused by regressiveness. The term labeled
V/o in Table 1 expresses V as a percentage of RE and helps us get a feel for the importance of
horizontal differences and reranking.  V tells us what RE would have been in the absence of
horizontal differences and reranking.  A value of  PV/o  of, say, 50% tells us that in absence of
horizontal differences and reranking, the pro-rich income redistribution associated with out-of-
pocket payments would have been only 50% of its actual value.  In the event, the values of V/O
are  between  30-40%,  indicating  that  horizontal  differences  and  reranking  combined  are
responsible for well over half of the pro-rich income redistribution associated with out-of-pocket
payments.  Both figures are far smaller than the figures reported for the OECD countries in van
Doorslaer et al. (op. cit.)-70-97%.  It is also worth noting that in both years, the majority of the
additional redistributive effect (i.e. that not due to progressivity) is due to reranking rather than
horizontal inequity. The aforementioned Voices of  the Poor tale  of the impoverished Lao Cai
does not appear to be an isolated example by any means.  The greater importance of reranking
over  horizontal  inequity  is  consistent  with  the  results  for  out-of-pocket  payments  in  the
Netherlands  reported  in  Wagstaff and  van  Doorslaer  [6].  Also  of note  in  Table  1 are the
reductions in the values of H and R.  The percentage reduction in H is larger, so that reranking
accounts for an even larger share of the additional redistributive effect in 1998.  Although H and
R both decline, their overall decline (40%) is smaller than the change in V. Their contribution to
redistributive  effect,  reflected  in  V°/ 0,  inevitably  therefore  rises-horizontal  differences  and
reranking were more important as sources of redistributive effect in 1998 than they were in 1993.
The overall picture, then, is one in which out-of-pocket payments absorb a sizeable share
of prepayment income but  are not associated with a major impact on income  inequality.  (It
should be  emphasized that  this  statement refers to  the impact of out-of-pocket payments  on
income inequality, not on poverty.)  Much of the impact of out-of-pocket payments on income
inequality  stem  not  from  their  regressiveness  but  rather  from  horizontal  differences'  and
reranking.  Between 1993 and 1998, the share of prepayment income absorbed by out-of-pocket
payments  fell somewhat and their regressiveness was  reduced by  a  much larger percentage.
Over  the  same  period,  the  redistributive  effect  associated  with  horizontal  differences  and
reranking also fell but by smaller percentages, so that these were even more important sources of
redistributive effect in 1998 than in 1993.
Results  such  as these  can help  shape policy.  Strengthening the  user-fee exemption
system in Vietnam-especially  as far as poor households are concerned-would  reduce further
the degree of regressiveness of out-of-pocket payments.  It would not, however, alter H and R,
and it is these that remain the major factors behind the adverse effect of out-of-pocket payments
on income inequality in  Vietnam.  They tend to  be driven largely by the unpredictability  of
illness and by the size of payments involved when illness strikes.  Additional reductions in the
real cost of drugs and medicines will help to further reduce H and R, but far bigger reductions
seem likely  to  come through  a  shifting away  from out-of-pocket  payments to  pre-payment.19
Though  (social)  insurance  developed  considerably  in  Vietnam  between  1993  and  1998,  it
remains relatively small-scale and is more common amongst the better-off.  Further expansion
can be expected to result in the less well-off being covered, and this in turn can be expected to
reduce further the values of H and R for out-of-pocket payments, as well as making  out-of-
pocket payments less regressive.
VII. Conclusions
This  paper  has  argued that the  index of  financial fairness proposed  in the  WHR is
unattractive.  It cannot allow the policymaker to know whether the index deviates  from one
(complete fairness) because households on similar incomes pay different amounts towards health
care (horizontal inequity) or because households on different incomes pay different proportions
of their income on health care (vertical inequity, given WHO's  interpretation of the ability-to-
pay principle).  And yet the two have quite different policy implications.  Furthermore, and more
controversially, the index treats progressivity as just as unfair as regressiveness.  This is highly
unattractive, since though policymakers may be strongly averse to regressive payments (since
they worsen the income distribution), they may-from  a fairness in financing perspective-be
quite willing to  see progressive payments.  Such payments may come about as the result of a
choice by the better-off to spend proportionally more on health care than the worse-off, or as the
result of a deliberate policy to require that that the better-off pay more in proportional terms.  In
other words, whilst it is probably accurate say that most policymakers feel comfortable with the
ability-to-pay principle as the underlying principle of health care finance, it seems most unlikely
that most-if  any-interpret  this in terms of a hard-and-fast rule on proportionality.
A more useful approach would be one that allows the policymaker to distinguish between
horizontal and  vertical equity, and  to  see the degree of progressivity in  the existing  system
without having had the analyst specify in advance how large this should be.  Such an approach is
provided by the decomposition framework proposed by Aronson et al. [8] in the early 1990s, and
used in  the health  finance literature in  the late  1990s [6, 7].  In this  framework fairness  is
assessed explicitly in terms of the impact of health care financing on the distribution of income,
since this  is,  after  all,  the  ultimate  concern  amongst policymakers when  they  think  about
financial protection.  In the approach, the change in the Gini coefficient for income caused by
health care payments is decomposed into terms corresponding to changes attributable to overall
share of income absorbed by health care payments, changes brought about by the progressivity
(or regressiveness) of the payment structure, changes brought about by horizontal inequities in
the system, and  changes brought about by households changing their position in  the income
distribution as a result of health care payments.
In the  last part of the paper, this  method was illustrated using data on  out-of-pocket
payments in Vietnam for the years 1993 and 1998.  The WHO index simply indicated a move
towards greater fairness over the period in question, but this could have been because payments
became  more  progressive,  or  became  less  regressive,  or  became  progressive  having  been
regressive, or became regressive having been progressive, or because of greater differences in
payments at each income  level.  With the Aronson  et al. approach, a much clearer picture
emerged.  Over the period in question, health care payments impacted adversely on the income
distribution in both years, but the degree of impact was smaller in 1998. This was due in part to20
a reduction in the share of income absorbed by out-of-pocket payments, in part to a reduction in
the regressiveness of out-of-pocket payments, but also in part to reductions in horizontal inequity
and reranking.  Of the two broad components of redistributive effect-vertical  and horizontal
redistribution-it  was the reduction in vertical redistribution that was more pronounced.21
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